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Non-technical Summary 
 
  Using a database from post-communist, pre-deposit-insurance Russia, we demonstrate 
the presence of quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks by both firms and households, 
particularly after the financial crisis of 1998. Banks net deposit inflows, that is, are shown to be 
highly sensitive to measures of bank capitalization, liquidity and changes in loan quality, 
particularly after the financial crisis of 1998. Quantity disciplining, moreover, appears to have 
been driven by the behavior of non-bank firms and, to a lesser extent, households. This finding is 
consistent with firm managers having greater knowledge of the relevant banking data and its 
meaning.  Nevertheless, the evidence that households, themselves, have developed a capacity for 
disciplining banks, is noteworthy and may in part be a reflection of their prior experience with 
bank failures earlier in the country’s transition.  
  Evidence for the standard form of price discipline, however, is notably weak. Depositors, 
that is, do not appear to "demand" higher deposit rates from banks with weaker fundamentals. 
The combination of this finding and the evidence on deposit flows noted above is unique in the 
general literature on market discipline. Rather than interpret the absence of price discipline as 
weakening the case for market discipline, we view it as consistent with a subtler form of 
discipline than that which has been explored in other contexts.  We estimate depositors' deposit 
supply function and find that increases in those rates eventually produce a decrease in deposit 
inflows. This effect, moreover, is particularly pronounced for poorly capitalized banks. The 
deposit rate, thus, appears to be viewed by depositors as a proxy for otherwise unobservable 
bank risk.  
  Our results thus suggest a real cost – in terms of reduced market discipline and 
subsequent moral hazard incentives – as Russia now moves forward with the introduction of 
widespread deposit insurance. More generally, given the doubt that has been expressed as to 
whether depositors in nascent markets will be both willing and able to discipline the banks 
entrusted with their funds, our findings suggest that market actors develop mechanisms and 
strategies to mitigate market failures with greater speed than perhaps initially thought. We should 
remember, however, that the post-communist experience with bank failures has imposed great 
costs across Russian society and effectively forced depositors to become the relatively quick 
learners and sophisticated discipliners that can now be observed in these data.   
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Sophisticated Discipline in Nascent Deposit Markets:  
Evidence from Post-Communist Russia 
 
 
Depositors may penalize banks for undertaking risks, performing poorly or otherwise 
jeopardizing the value of their assets. By withdrawing funds or requiring deposit rate premiums 
from less stable institutions, their actions have the potential to increase allocative efficiency and 
mitigate moral hazard. But this sort of quantity or price-based discipline only materializes if 
depositors possess both the willingness and ability to monitor their banks. Whereas the former 
depends upon the degree to which deposits are believed to be protected by regulatory oversight 
and (explicit or implicit) insurance guarantees, the latter requires both access to and 
understanding of the relevant bank data (Barth et al., 2006).  
While not as much of a concern when depositors are experienced and mechanisms for 
disseminating financial information are reliable, the ability to discipline banks in settings in 
which these features are under-developed has been open to question. Indeed, doubts have been 
expressed as to the private sector’s capacity for effective monitoring in countries in which 
informational structures – such as accounting rules and disclosure requirements – lag behind 
international standards (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2004). On the other hand, it has been suggested that 
this sort of institutional immaturity is coincident with banking sector simplicity and a more 
concentrated business community, both of which may contribute to depositors confronting lower 
costs to uncovering bank information. As a result, some believe there to be “no systematic 
tendency” for less developed countries to be less endowed with the prerequisites for market 
discipline (Caprio and Honohan, 2004).  Careful empirical studies, however, that either confirm  
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or cast doubt upon the ability of depositors to discipline banks in immature institutional 
environments are rare. 
Post-communist Russia presents us with a worthy test case of depositors’ capacity to 
provide discipline in a nascent market with under-developed institutions. Concurrent with the 
systemic transformation launched in the early 1990s, hundreds of private commercial banks 
entered its new, largely un-regulated, deposit market (Spicer and Pyle, 2002). Not surprisingly, 
several significant banking crises ensued. And since monies held in non-state banks were 
uninsured, the country’s depositors made quick acquaintance with the private costs of 
institutional failure. In other words, from soon after the dawn of the new market era, depositors 
possessed ample motivation to penalize banks known to be performing poorly and/or assuming 
undue risks.
1 But, as noted, the willingness to impose discipline on institutions recognized as less 
stable is not tantamount to the ability to do so.  
Barth et al. (2004, 2006) capture the cross-national variation with respect to this ability to 
impose discipline in a “private sector monitoring” (PSM) index, a measure of institutional 
development that ranks Russia in the bottom quintile of over one hundred countries.
2 In 
conjunction with Russians’ relatively brief experience with evaluating the relative merits of 
deposit-taking institutions, the institutional immaturity that this ranking suggests raises a 
question about depositors’ ability to monitor and discipline banks, even though their motivation 
for doing so would appear to be great.   
Drawing on a unique database from the pre-deposit-insurance stage of Russia’s post-
communist transition (1997-2003), we demonstrate below that, indeed, depositors have actively 
disciplined private, domestic banks. In spite of the country’s apparent institutional immaturity, 
standard measures of the capacity to meet deposit obligations (e.g., capitalization and liquidity)  
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correlate strongly with net deposit flows in the subsequent period. But while evidence for 
quantity-based discipline is strong and robust, that for the standard form of price-based discipline 
is not. Clear evidence, that is, that depositors “demand” higher deposit rates from less stable 
institutions is lacking.  
In and of itself, the absence of such evidence should not be interpreted as suggesting that 
market discipline is weak. Indeed, the combination of strong evidence for quantity disciplining 
and nearly non-existent support for the standard form of price disciplining is consistent with a 
different type of price discipline that, arguably, is more sophisticated than that uncovered in 
previous studies. Depositors, we say, exhibit this sophisticated discipline if they view the deposit 
rate as a complementary proxy for institutional stability and not purely as a mechanism through 
which banks compete for funds and offer compensation for risk or poor performance reflected in 
their fundamentals. So viewed, banks cannot necessarily expect to increase the net inflow of 
deposits, ceteris paribus, by raising deposit rates. More than just compensating for observable 
risk, raising rates may carry the suggestion of additional risk. If so, standard tests for market 
discipline may not produce strong results and should be complemented by direct estimation of 
the deposit supply function. This would produce evidence consistent with sophisticated 
discipline if higher rates exhibited diminishing marginal -- even negative – returns in terms of 
deposit attraction. 
To date, much of the evidence for deposit market discipline comes from countries with 
mature and relatively transparent banking sectors. For instance, a number of studies of partially 
uninsured large deposits in the United States demonstrate that a bank’s cost of funds in one 
period is associated with previous period measures of depositor risk: low capital-assets ratios 
(Cook and Spellman, 1994; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Park and Peristiani, 1998); high  
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variability of return on assets (Hannan and Hanweck, 1988); higher percentages of bad loans and, 
generally, lower return on assets (Cook and Spellman, 1994; Park and Perstiani, 1998); and 
greater exposure to junk bonds (Brewer and Mondschean, 1994). Cook and Spellman (1994), 
moreover, show that interest rates on wholly insured deposits at S&L’s reflect capitalization and 
performance measures; even government sponsored “guarantees,” after all, may not be ironclad. 
Finally, Park and Peristiani (1998) demonstrate a negative relationship between U.S. thrifts’ 
predicted probability of failure and the subsequent growth of large uninsured deposits. Both price 
and quantity discipline, in other words, have been shown to prevail in the United States’ banking 
sector, particularly with respect to deposits that are not fully insured. 
A few empirically focused studies have pursued this theme in countries with less 
developed informational infrastructures. Controlling for the presence of deposit insurance and 
using data from a sample of both OECD and developing countries, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2004) find a negative relationship between the implicit cost of bank funds and prior period 
measures of bank capitalization, profitability and liquidity.
3   The evidence for quantity 
disciplining, however, is weaker. Indeed, they find no significant relationship between the net 
growth in bank deposits and its earlier measures of either profitability or liquidity. Investigating 
experiences in Argentina, Chile and Mexico, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) turn up 
evidence consistent with both the standard forms of quantity and price discipline. Controlling 
simultaneously for several measures of bank stability and risk, they demonstrate that banks’ 
deposits increase and their deposit rates generally decrease with a reduction in the percentage of 
non-performing loans and improvements in liquidity and capitalization. These authors also 
highlight how the relative magnitude of deposit market discipline increases after banking crises, 
suggesting that shocks to the sector breed greater depositor vigilance.   
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Compared to the countries highlighted in the Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) study, 
Russia’s temporal experience with liberalized deposit markets has been brief and its institutions 
to support depositor monitoring have been less fully developed.
4 In our subsequent exploration 
of the capacity for market discipline in this setting, we contribute to the general literature in this 
area in two new and important ways.  First, we explore the impact of depositor type in a manner 
not done elsewhere. Whereas previous studies have examined market discipline by actors 
holding deposits of different sizes (Cook and Spellman, 1994; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 
2001), our data uniquely allow us to distinguish depositors by legal status – i.e., non-bank firm, 
bank or household. While likely to be correlated with deposit size, a party’s identity in this sense 
may convey information about its willingness and ability to impose discipline. Relative to 
households, for example, enterprise managers might be presumed to either have better access to 
or more appreciation for the financial information released by banks. They may also face lower 
costs of switching institutions, a potentially non-trivial consideration for households, particularly 
those outside the largest urban areas where retail banking networks are poorly developed. And 
although we have no information on the time structure of bank liabilities, we might expect that 
inter-bank deposits would be less sensitive to risk characteristics than the deposits of households 
or firms since a relatively high percentage may represent stocks of short maturity, such as 
overnight loans, whose value is less threatened by the risk of institutional failure.   
Our second contribution to this general literature is more substantial. After estimating, 
like other studies, two standard sets of models to study market discipline, one for deposit growth 
and one for interest rates, we employ an additional model to test for the presence of sophisticated 
discipline. Specifically, we estimate depositors’ supply function so as to evaluate whether or not 
price in this market is interpreted as a supplementary proxy for bank-level risk. The critical  
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identification problem is handled by assuming that a bank’s lending rate reflects changes in its 
lending opportunities and should therefore be entered as an independent variable in its deposit 
demand function, while not in its supply function.   
In carrying out this estimation, we draw inspiration from the framework outlined by 
Hellman et al. (1998, 2000) in which  
…depositors can perfectly infer (from the bank’s deposit rate and capital base) 
whether the bank will gamble or invest in the prudent asset … assumptions 
[chosen] not for realism but to consider an environment most conducive to 
solving the moral hazard problem via private monitoring (1998, p. 5).
5 
From our perspective, the important point in their stylized framework is that deposit rates and 
capitalization – both independently and through their interaction – determine the net inflow of 
deposits and, thus, the presence of market discipline. Specifically, higher interest rates, 
particularly for lower levels of capitalization, are recognized as coincident with future bank 
intentions to engage in a more risky lending strategy.  Depositors, therefore, must weigh the 
benefits of higher rates against an increased potential of bank failure. The authors’ caveat as to 
their assumption’s realism clearly speaks to a lack of credulity in depositors’ actual ability to 
read banks’ behavior in this manner.
6  To the extent that such sentiment as to depositor 
sophistication is widely held, it would seem reasonable to identify any empirical support for the 
actual interpretation of deposit rates in this manner as evidence of a surprisingly subtle and 
sophisticated form of discipline.  
We divide the article into four sections. Section I discusses the empirical methodology, 
and section II presents the data and variables used in the subsequent analysis. We then present 
our empirical results in section III, followed by conclusions in section IV.  
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I.   Methodology 
We start by investigating the evidence for market discipline generally and then proceed to 
look for it in the behavior of specific depositor groups. In so doing, we employ two standard sets 
of reduced form models:    
,, 1 , ' it it t i it D Bank d v e β − ∆= + + +        ( 1 )  
,, 1 , '
d
it it t i it i Bank d v β ω − =+ + +       ( 2 )  
with the number of banks i = 1,…,N and the number of observations per bank t = 1,…,T.
7 The 
left-hand side variables are, respectively, the first difference of the log of deposits held by bank i 
at time t, and the (implicit) real interest rate paid on those deposits.  ,1 it Bank −  is a vector of bank-
specific variables assumed exogenous and included with a quarterly lag to account for the fact 
that financial reports are not instantaneously made available to the public. Time dummies,  t d , 
are included to control for macroeconomic shocks that influence the banking system as a whole. 
And we allow for unobserved bank heterogeneity by introducing a bank-specific, time-invariant 
effect, vi. The error terms, ei,t and ωi,t, are assumed to be independently distributed with mean 
zero and variance σ
2
i,t.
8  
In both models (1) and (2), observing the coefficient estimates for the bank-specific 
variables provides the basis for tests of market discipline. Generally speaking, we look for 
statistically significant associations between those variables that measure a bank’s capacity for 
responding to deposit withdrawals and its subsequent net deposit flows and deposit rates. All else 
equal, weaker banks are described as subject to market discipline if they experience less net 
growth in deposits or if they pay higher deposit rates. Depositors, that is, are presumed to react to 
the observed weakness by either (a) channeling monies away from weaker institutions or (b)  
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requiring a deposit rate premium as compensation. Two dependent variables, it is thought, 
provide a more comprehensive test of market discipline than relying upon just one (Martinez-
Peria and Schmukler, 2001).
9 
The data allow us to estimate several versions of these two models. For one, we explore 
the impact of the financial crisis on market discipline, estimating model (1) for periods both 
before and after the August 1998 ruble devaluation and sovereign debt repudiation.
10 By splitting 
the post-crisis data into sub-periods, we then can check whether the documented effects remain 
stable over time. We also test the relationship between depositor identity and market discipline 
by estimating separate models for both the deposits held by and the deposit rates paid to non-
bank firms, households and banks. And last, we run the models both inclusive and exclusive of 
banks that are state owned or are “pocket banks” who gear lending activity to owners or 
company insiders.
11  With respect to all versions, we report within (fixed effects) or pooled 
estimators depending on whether the fixed effects are jointly significant. 
We employ a new and separate model to test for sophisticated discipline in which the 
deposit rate itself serves as a complementary proxy of institutional stability. As such, rate 
increases amount to more than a means to attract deposits or offer compensation for increased 
risk, ceteris paribus. They are interpreted, as well, as coincident with an increase in risk not 
reflected in other observed measures (Hellman et al., 1998, 2000). If higher deposit rates, 
particularly in combination with other risk measures (e.g., low capitalization), are so interpreted, 
the effect of raising interest rates on the volume of deposits supplied will not necessarily be 
positive. The deposit supply curve, that is, may be backward bending.  
 We directly estimate the supply function employing the following two specifications: 
2
,, 1 1 , 2 , , '( )
dd
it it it it t i it D Bank i i d v β δδ ε − ∆= + + + + + (3)  
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, , 1 1 , 2 , 3 ,, 1 4 ,, 1 , ' ( ) *(1 ) *(1 )
dd d d
it it it it it it it it t i it D Bank i i i Cap i Cap d v β δδ δ δ ε −− − ∆= + + + − + − + + +(4) 
where the real deposit rate, 
d
t i i , , its square and its interaction with a measure of bank 
capitalization, (with  1 , − t i Cap  representing the capital-assets ratio) and its square, are included to 
test for the interaction of price and risk measures and the hypothesized backward-bending supply 
curve.  ,1 it Bank −  is a vector of exogenous supply shifters – the same as employed in models (1) 
and (2), with the exception being that we exclude those regressors that had been either 
consistently insignificant or unstable and rarely significant in the prior estimations. 
The key problem is to identify the supply function. To solve it, we assume that a bank’s 
lending rate belongs to its demand function for deposits but not to the supply function. Most 
depositors (actual or potential) are unlikely to observe this lending rate, and even if they could, 
we would not expect it to affect their deposit supply decisions directly. On the other hand, 
changing investment opportunities for a bank will shift its demand for deposits, thus leading to a 
change in its cost of funds (i.e., its deposit rate). Being an indicator of these opportunities, the 
lending rate can serve as an instrument for its total deposit rate.
12 
We employ the Difference Generalized Method of Moments estimator (GMM) proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991). Terms involving the deposit rate are treated as endogenous. The 
lending rate, its square, as well as suitably lagged values of endogenous variables are used as 
instruments. We apply the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions to determine the general 
validity of the chosen instruments and the associated assumptions as to the endogeneity or 
exogeneity of the regressors.
13 By splitting the sample into a small banks and a large banks sub-
sample, we then check whether the documented effects are independent of size. 
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II.   Data and Variables 
All banks are required to disclose their financial statements to the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR) on a regular basis.
14 Balance sheet information and profit and loss accounts are reported, 
respectively, on monthly and quarterly bases. After roughly a two-month lag, these data are then 
made available to the public through several channels. Since 1999, the financial statements of 
most banks have been posted on the website of the CBR (www.cbr.ru). Some of this information 
is then published by the financial press.
15 Private information agencies, moreover, in cooperation 
with the CBR, gather raw, bank-specific accounting data to generate standardized financial 
indicators. Some of this processed data, often sufficient for a general analysis of a bank’s risk 
profile, is made available for free, whereas the most detailed information can only be accessed 
through fee-based channels.
16 
The bank data used in the analysis here were made available to the authors by two 
established and highly respected private financial information agencies, Interfax and Mobile.
17 
The former provides quarterly measures of bank balances and profit and loss accounts as well as 
bank-specific scores on a battery of regulatory standards from 1999 through 2002. The latter 
offers bank balances on a monthly basis from mid-1995 through 2002 and profit and loss 
accounts on a quarterly basis from October 2000 through 2002. As the profit and loss data are 
necessary for constructing implicit interest rates as well as efficiency ratios, we limit our analysis 
to quarterly observations. The absence of profit and loss data before 1999 inhibits us from 
investigating price discipline prior to that year. 
We merge quarterly observations of the two datasets (both expressed in rubles) by date 
and bank registration numbers.
18 For those cases in which a bank merged or was acquired, we 
treat the resulting larger bank as “new” from the standpoint of our sample. However, given the  
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requisite differencing and lagging in our analysis, this requires dropping at least the first two 
observations for this “new” bank. To avoid this loss of data, we sum up the financial statements 
of the two merging banks for the two quarters preceding the merger and use those merged 
accounts as the needed lags.
19 
The bank-specific variables used in this paper include deposits and interest rates as well 
as measures of risk, performance and balance sheet structure. The (implicit) interest rate that a 
bank offers on its deposits has been calculated by dividing interest expenses during a particular 
period by the corresponding level of deposits (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001).
20 Since our 
dataset disaggregates both interest expenses and deposits by the legal status of the depositor, the 
variables measuring deposit flows and interest rates can be constructed separately for non-bank 
firms, households and banks.  
Many of the bank-specific measures of risk and performance that we include in our 
specifications are common to the literature. Capitalization, measured as the ratio of capital over 
assets, is expected to be positively associated with the subsequent growth of real deposits and 
inversely related to the next quarter’s deposit rates.  As much as any single measure of bank 
stability, it has been shown to serve as the basis for market discipline by depositors (Cook and 
Spellman, 1994; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Park and Peristiani, 1998; Martinez-Peria and 
Schmukler, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). 
In general, one would expect liquidity to have the same effect as capitalization with 
respect to market discipline. Highly liquid banks, that is, should be considered more capable of 
accommodating unexpected withdrawals (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2004). We therefore expect a bank’s current liquidity ratio – i.e., the sum of its 
liquid assets divided by the sum of its liabilities on demand accounts and accounts up to 30 days  
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– to be positively associated with deposit growth and negatively with interest payments, ceteris 
paribus. 
The relationship of market disciplining behavior and a second measure of liquidity, 
excess reserves (relative to assets) deposited with the central bank, is not a priori clear. In a more 
mature market economy, we might expect excess reserves to measure the capacity to meet 
demand for deposit withdrawals. We should consider, however, that Russian banks engaging in 
speculative activities and wishing to conceal the nature of their business often clear their position 
and park their monies with the CBR when the accounts are closed. High excess reserves may 
thus be related to greater risk and thus lower deposit growth and higher deposit rates. It is also 
possible that high excess reserves may be a function more of problems in the payment system 
than a desire to maintain excess liquidity for deposit withdrawals (Schoors, 2001).  
Controls are also included for measures that directly capture bank performance. Higher 
returns relative to assets, we would expect, will increase the stability of deposit institutions and 
make them less prone to market disciplining (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). Moreover, 
growth in their share of non-performing loans should be inversely related to deposit growth and 
positively associated with interest rates (Cook and Spellman, 1994; Martinez-Peria and 
Schmukler, 2001; and Park and Peristani, 1998).  
We also take into account efficiency considerations by controlling for operational costs 
relative to bank size. If we were to assume a homogenous level of service quality across banks, 
higher personnel expenses as a share of assets should be related to more sanctioning actions. 
Less cost-effective banks, that is, should be perceived as less stable and, thus, more prone to 
deposit outflows or pressure to raise deposit rates. On the other hand, since most Russian banks 
have been known to operate with poorly trained staffs, higher personnel costs may be interpreted  
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as associated with a higher level of human capital and, thus, better asset management and a more 
stable institution. The expected sign, therefore, is not clear.  
Variables capturing balance sheet structure are included as controls as well. Although the 
literature does not generally consider them as proxies for stability or performance in studies of 
market discipline, it is at least possible that, ceteris paribus, they could be interpreted as such. In 
this respect, the expected sign for loans to non-banks as a share of assets is not a priori clear, in 
part because we cannot distinguish loans either by risk or maturity. A high share of loans to non-
banks could either signal greater credit risk or indicate a greater predisposition to engage in more 
traditional and, perhaps, less speculative activities. The relationship between lending to 
households as a share of all loans is similarly ambiguous. On the one hand, few Russians have 
well-developed credit records, making lending to them a risky proposition. However, loans to 
households may have shorter maturities and thus expose lenders to less liquidity risk.  
Controls for the structure of bank liabilities are also included. Term deposits as a share of 
all non-bank claims partly capture the maturity structure of liabilities. Banks capable of attracting 
time deposits have effectively had their stability certified by previous depositors, thus making 
them potentially less prone to market discipline. However, since term deposits tend to command 
higher interest rates than demand deposits, the relationship between this variable and the 
standard form of price-based market discipline is not altogether clear. Growth in term deposits, 
all else equal, will produce higher payments to depositors. But to the extent that this growth is 
interpreted as a signal of depositor-conferred stability, we would expect there to be downward 
pressure on any deposit risk premium. We thus do not have a clear expectation as to the sign on 
this variable.  
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Table I summarizes our predictions for the signs of the coefficients on the right-hand side 
variables.
21 And Table II presents summary statistics, by quarter, for all banks included in our 
sample. Deposit growth, interest rates and return on assets are all expressed in real terms. 
Deposit growth has been positive across all three depositor types but has been fastest over this 
period among households. As is apparent in rows 5 to 8, firm deposits represent the largest share 
of bank liabilities, followed by those of households and then banks. The lowest (implicit) real 
interest rates are paid on firms’ deposits, whereas the highest are paid on inter-bank funds. There 
are 155 banks in our sample that report capitalization of less than zero at least once during the 
period under consideration, with most of these cases occurring in the aftermath of the 1998 
financial crisis. Panel B of Table II presents the summary statistics for the pre- and the post-crisis 
periods separately. The standard deviation of key variables, like capitalization and liquidity, is 
comparable across these periods.  
As was noted in the previous section, we check the robustness of our empirical results by 
performing all estimations both with and without state-owned as well as “pocket” banks. 
Because of their access (real or presumed) to public resources, the former are generally believed 
to provide depositors with weak incentives for monitoring and disciplining (Caprio and 
Honohan, 2004). Indeed, in Russia, state-owned banks have enjoyed a number of advantages 
over their private competitors, including privileged access to state funds, de facto exemption 
from some regulatory norms, and during the entirety of the period covered by our data, explicit 
backing for their retail deposits (Tompson, 2004). For the purposes of our analysis, we can 
distinguish between two types of state-owned banks in Russia, those owned by the CBR and 
those owned by federal or regional authorities or other government entities.
22 The  former 
(Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank and Vnesheconombank) have enjoyed the full and consistent backing  
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of the CBR and so, considering them less likely to have been subject to market discipline, are 
excluded from our sample. The second group, however, includes institutions that have been 
allowed to fail (e.g., Unikombank, Soto-bank, Trade-bank), although the state formally 
guarantees their household deposits (Civil Code of Russia, article 840). We include these banks 
in the estimations since they may well have been disciplined by other depositor classes.
23  
To identify “pocket” banks, which have geared their lending activities heavily toward 
owners and insiders, we use two regulatory standards: owner exposure (the aggregate amount of 
credits and loans extended to the bank’s shareholders or partners) and insider exposure (the 
aggregate amount of credits and loans extended to employees and managers).
24 The respective 
legal thresholds that are not to be exceeded are 50% and 3% of the bank’s equity capital. We first 
thought to define an institution as a “pocket” bank if during our sample period it violates each of 
these two standards at least once. However, the number of banks identified by this procedure, 
roughly forty, is small. Considering, moreover, that banks might manipulate their books in order 
to satisfy these regulatory standards, we relaxed the definition by reducing the thresholds to 66% 
(definition 1) and further to 33% (definition 2) of the respective legal thresholds. We thus 
characterize an institution as a “pocket” bank if, during our sample period, it breaches each of 
these revised thresholds at least once. 
III.   Results     
We lay out our main results in two sections. First, we present and discuss the standard 
market discipline model, examining how measures of bank risk in one quarter relate to the 
subsequent quarter’s net deposit flows and interest payments. In a second section, we test 
whether depositors interpret deposit rates as complementing standard measures of bank risk. To 
save space, the tables report only the variables of economic interest, not the time dummies.   
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III.A   Market discipline and depositor type 
This section presents our findings as to whether or not we observe standard forms of 
market discipline behavior in Russia. Table III displays estimation results for the deposit flow 
model (1) for the pre-crisis period (April 1997 – July 1998), the post-crisis period (October 1999 
– January 2003) and 6 sub-periods after the crisis. In broad terms, the results confirm the 
presence of market discipline. Most notably, a higher capital-assets ratio and greater liquidity 
predict greater net deposit inflows in the subsequent period. Although these findings hold up 
both before and after the 1998 crisis, discipline exercised in response to these variables seems to 
have increased substantially in its aftermath.
25 This result is consistent with the proposition that 
crises breed greater depositor vigilance (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). Further, the 
relationship between deposit flows and these two measures of bank risk is shown to be robust 
across all post-crisis sub-periods.  
We also see evidence in support of the presence of market discipline both before and 
after the crisis in the negative and statistically significant correlation between deposit growth in a 
quarter and the previous quarter’s increase in non-performing loans. This relationship, however, 
is not as strong as the findings for capitalization and liquidity and is shown not to be robust to the 
segmentation of periods after 1998. And, interestingly, return on assets is not consistently 
correlated with net deposit inflows after the crisis, even though it was before. It is possible that 
Russian depositors have learned not to put too much weight on the profitability rates posted by 
Russian banks. Indeed, Malyutina and Parilova (2001) note that “It has already become a 
conventional wisdom that official figures for profits of Russian banks are the most manipulated 
and thus unreliable ones.”   
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We should note, as well, that after the crisis excess reserves with the CBR are negatively 
associated with deposit inflows, which suggests that it might be interpreted as a proxy for a 
riskier asset management strategy. Moreover, one balance sheet structure variable – loans to non-
bank firms as a share of total assets – was statistically insignificant before the 1998 crisis but 
becomes significant and positive in its aftermath. This latter finding is also at least consistent 
with the proposition that depositors feel safer with banks appearing to engage in more traditional 
and, perhaps, less speculative investment activities. Finally, we observe banks that pay their 
personnel more, ceteris paribus, are more successful in attracting funds. 
In Table IV, we lay out the results for the model that uses the deposit rate as the 
dependent variable.
26 In terms of providing evidence for market discipline, the results are clearly 
weaker than those noted in Table III. Although the negative signs on the capitalization and 
liquidity measures are what we would expect if depositor discipline were present, the statistical 
significance of these associations is not strong and does not hold up to the decomposition across 
sub-periods. Specifically, there is no evidence that weakly capitalized banks pay higher interest 
rates to depositors as compensation. We also find only weak evidence that depositors accept 
higher interest rates in return for lower liquidity. Finally, we do not see any significant 
relationship between the dependent variable and either the bank’s profitability or its increase in 
non-performing loans.  In sum, our results strongly confirm the presence of quantity discipline 
but offer little to no support for the standard form of price discipline.  
In Table V we repeat the main equations of Table III and IV for the three depositor types: 
non-bank firms, households and banks. The results confirming quantity discipline, particularly in 
the post-crisis period, appear to be driven most strongly by the behavior of firms. As can be 
observed, firm deposits are much more sensitive to liquidity, the change in loan quality and the  
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capital-assets ratio than those of households or banks. Households, however, do display some 
sensitivity to each of these measures, particularly in the post-crisis period. As depositors in other 
institutions, banks are shown to be responsive to capitalization in the post-crisis period but little 
else.  
Disaggregated by depositor legal status, the results for the standard form of price 
discipline are, again, not as strong. Table V demonstrates only weak and sporadic associations 
between increased bank risk and the “demands” of firms, households or banks for compensation 
in the form of higher deposit rates. Only among firms (but not households or banks), do we 
observe a negative and statistically significant association between capitalization and subsequent 
deposit rates. And only among households and banks (but not firms), do we see a similar 
relationship between these rates and liquidity. And, notably, with respect to non-performing 
loans and profitability, we do not observe any evidence for the standard form of price discipline 
among any of the depositor types.   
  We include Table VI to demonstrate the general robustness of our results to the exclusion 
of state banks and “pocket” banks, variously defined. Most notably, capitalization and liquidity 
remain strong predictors of deposit flows but, at most, only weak predictors of subsequent 
interest rates. 
III.B   Sophisticated discipline 
Among studies of deposit market discipline, our finding of strong evidence for quantity 
disciplining but little to no support for the standard form of price discipline stands out as unique. 
But, as we noted earlier, this result should not be interpreted, in and of itself, as suggesting that 
market discipline is weak. Indeed, our finding is consistent with a different, perhaps more  
  20
sophisticated, form of price discipline in which deposit rates represent more than just a 
mechanism for competing for funds and compensating depositors for observable risk.  
We now explore the manner in which deposit rates might complement other variables 
that capture a bank’s prospects for honoring its liabilities. Specifically, we ask whether these 
rates are interpreted as a signal of bank stability (Hellman et al., 1998 and 2000). If they do, we 
should not expect there to be a clear positive relationship between the rates a bank posts and its 
subsequent ability to attract deposits, perhaps especially for banks already viewed as weak with 
respect to other measures, such as capitalization.  
Table VII presents estimations of the deposit supply function, using specifications (3) and 
(4). We first report results for all banks, then inclusive of just non-state banks and non-“pocket” 
banks, variously defined. Both specifications (3) and (4) allow for a non-linear relationship 
between interest rates and deposits such that after a certain “switching point” the slope of the 
supply curve can change sign. In specification (4), the interest rate is interacted with 
capitalization to investigate whether the price elasticity of deposit supply is sensitive to an 
observed measure of bank risk (Hellman et al., 1998 and 2000). All reported equations pass both 
the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions and the test for second-order autocorrelation at 
the 10% significance level.  
The results in Table VII demonstrate a non-linear interest rate effect in the columns that 
represent specification (3), suggesting an implied switching point of six percent, above which 
increases in real interest rates produce negative returns with respect to deposit attraction. In 
addition, in the columns that represent specification (4), we observe a joint effect of interest rates 
and capitalization on deposit growth. The implied switching point of roughly twelve percent 
appears stable across sample definitions. Both the independent and interaction effects of interest  
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rate changes and bank capitalization can be viewed in Figure 1, which shows the deposit growth 
plane in the interest rate/capitalization space, evaluated at the average values of the other 
independent variables. At low and intermediate interest rate levels, a bank’s deposit growth in 
response to interest rate hikes is positively correlated with bank capitalization. Moreover, higher 
capitalization is positively correlated with the switching point beyond which interest rate 
increases produce negative returns with respect to deposit attraction.  Panel A shows the results 
for all banks in our sample and Panel B shows them for banks that are neither state-owned nor 
“pocket” banks.  
This evidence is consistent with depositors growing suspicious as interest rates rise. Their 
suspicion, moreover, that interest rate hikes might reflect new sources of bank risk, not otherwise 
observed, is sensitive to an observed measure that all our results have suggested is important to 
market disciplining behavior. In other words, the evidence suggests that if depositors are 
confident in a bank’s ability to meet deposit withdrawals, on the basis of its capital-assets ratio, 
they are more apt to view its rate increases as coincident with increases in the expected return on 
their deposits and, thus, increase their supply of deposits accordingly. But a bank which already 
has given depositors reason for suspicion, due to its lower capitalization, does not have the same 
ability to translate its increase in deposit rates into a corresponding increase in the expected 
returns and, thus, the deposits of its depositors.   
Table VIII demonstrates that our results are not driven by size effects. We split the 
sample into two sub-samples – the smallest 80% and the largest 20% – and re-estimate 
specification (3) for both. Although large banks’ deposits are les sensitive to capitalization and 
liquidity than the deposits of small banks, both sub-samples show evidence of more sophisticated 
discipline. Small banks exhibit an implied switching point of five percent while large banks  
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enjoy a higher switching point of eleven percent, above which increases in real interest rates 
produce negative returns with respect to deposit attraction. Figure 2 shows deposit growth as a 
function of the deposit rate for large and small banks respectively, evaluated at the average 
values of the other independent variables.  At low interest rates deposits of small banks grow 
faster than those of large banks, but this deposit growth reaches a turning point if real interest 
rates exceed five percent. The lines cross at a real rate of about nine percent, above which the 
deposit growth of large banks really dominates the deposit growth of small banks.  
IV.   Conclusion 
Even though the deposit market in Russia is young and its supporting institutional / 
informational infrastructure is relatively immature, the country’s depositors have developed the 
capacity – both the willingness and the ability – to identify and discipline weaker banks. Banks 
net deposit inflows, specifically, have been shown to be highly sensitive to measures of bank 
capitalization, liquidity and changes in loan quality, particularly after the financial crisis of 1998. 
Quantity disciplining, moreover, appears to have been driven by the behavior of non-bank firms 
and, to a lesser extent, households. This finding is at least consistent with the proposition that 
firm managers have greater knowledge of the relevant banking data and its meaning.   
Nevertheless, the evidence that households, themselves, have developed a capacity for 
disciplining banks, is noteworthy and may in part be a reflection of their prior experience with 
bank failures, in massive numbers, earlier in the country’s post-communist transition.   
The strong presence of quantity discipline and the relative absence of price discipline, at 
least as traditionally conceived, present us with a combination of findings not observed in prior 
studies. Rather than interpret this combination as an apparent disjunction weakening the case for 
market discipline, we view it more consistent with a subtler form of discipline than that which  
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has been explored in other contexts.  Indeed, we observe that the supply of deposits is highly 
sensitive to real interest rates and, importantly, that increases in those rates eventually produce a 
decrease in deposit inflows. This effect, moreover, is particularly pronounced for banks already 
viewed as weak because of their low capitalization. The deposit rate, thus, appears to be viewed 
not just as a mechanism of inter-bank competition but also as a proxy for risk that would 
otherwise not be observable to depositors. It is at least conceivable that because a subset of bank 
managers have yet to fully understand depositors’ interpretation of rate increases, some banks 
continue to raise interest rates only to see their stock of deposits decline.    
Our results do suggest a real cost – in terms of reduced market discipline and subsequent 
moral hazard incentives – as Russia now moves forward with the introduction of widespread 
deposit insurance. But more generally, given the doubt that has been expressed as to whether 
depositors in nascent markets will be both willing and able to discipline the banks entrusted with 
their funds, our findings offer support for the proposition that markets and market actors develop 
mechanisms and strategies to mitigate market failures with greater speed than perhaps initially 
thought. We should remember, however, that the post-communist experience with bank failures 
has imposed great costs across Russian society and effectively forced depositors to become the 
relatively quick learners and sophisticated discipliners that can now be observed in these data. 
Banking data from an earlier period of the country’s transition may well have revealed an 
entirely different picture.    
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Table I. Empirical Predictions 
Expected sign 
Bank-specific RHS variables 
 
Specification 1 and 
3 
Specification 2 
Capital / Total assets  + - 
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities  + - 
Change in loan quality  - + 
Return on assets  + - 
Excess reserves / Total assets  ? ? 
Loans to non-banks / Total assets  ? ? 
Loans to households / Loans to 
non-banks  ? ? 
Term deposits / Total deposits  + ? 
Personnel expenses / Total assets  ? ? 
Real deposit rate  + Not  included 
Real deposit rate ^2  - Not  included 
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Table II. Summary Statistics, Panel A: 1997-2002 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
Total deposit growth  26023 0,03  0,61  -7,73 12,96 
Firm deposit growth  26011 0,03  0,72  -8,83  9,18 
Household deposit growth  24187 0,05  0,89  -9,63 12,14 
Bank deposit growth  9497 0,00 1,20  -13,06  12,91 
Total deposits / Total assets  26023  0,40 0,20 0,00 0,98 
Firm deposits / Total assets  26023  0,27 0,18 0,00 0,97 
Household deposits / Total assets  26023  0,09 0,09 0,00 0,76 
Bank deposits / Total assets  26023  0,05 0,10 0,00 0,93 
Interest rate on total deposits   16858 -0,02  0,03  -0,07  0,44 
Interest rate on firm deposits   16517 -0,03  0,02  -0,07  0,44 
Interest rate on household deposits   15150 0,00  0,07  -0,07  0,48 
Interest rate on bank deposits   7134 0,01 0,07 -0,07 0,46 
Interest rate on total loans   16402 0,01  0,05  -0,07  0,45 
Interest rate on firm loans  16263 0,01  0,05  -0,07  0,43 
Interest rate on household loans  15038 0,02  0,06  -0,07  0,43 
Interest rate on bank loans  8238 0,02 0,09 -0,07 0,47 
Capital / Total assets  26023 0,28  0,20  -0,87  0,99 
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities  26023  0,63 0,79 0,00 9,99 
Bad loans / Total loans  26023  0,05 0,13 0,00 1,00 
Return on assets  26023 -0,03  0,03  -0,50  0,93 
Excess reserves / Total assets  26023  0,10 0,12 0,00 0,96 
Loans to non-banks / Total assets  26023  0,41 0,20 0,00 0,99 
Loans to households / Loans to non-
banks  26023  0,12 0,19 0,00 1,00 
Term deposits / Total deposits  26023  0,31 0,25 0,00 1,00 
Personnel expenses / Total assets  16954  0,01 0,01 0,00 0,26 
 
Note: The table presents the summary statistics of the bank-specific variables with each 
observation representing a measure for a single bank in a specific quarter. Only 
observations used in at least one of the regressions are included. 
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Table II. Summary Statistics, Panel B: Pre-crisis and Post-crisis 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Total deposit growth  9069 -0,07 0,69 -6,72 12,96  16954 0,08  0,55  -7,73  8,10 
Firm deposit growth  9059 -0,06 0,86 -7,71 9,18  16952  0,07 0,64  -8,83  8,27 
Household deposit growth  8471 -0,05 1,06 -9,63 12,14  15716 0,10  0,77  -8,72  10,27 
Bank deposit growth  3607 -0,13 1,24 -8,84 7,57 5890 0,08 1,18  -13,06  12,91 
Total deposits / Total assets  9069 0,33 0,19 0,00 0,95  16954  0,45 0,20  0,00  0,98 
Firm deposits / Total assets  9069 0,20 0,16 0,00 0,93  16954  0,31 0,19  0,00  0,97 
Household deposits / Total assets  9069 0,07 0,08 0,00 0,56  16954  0,09 0,10  0,00  0,76 
Bank deposits / Total assets  9069 0,05 0,11 0,00 0,91  16954  0,04 0,09  0,00  0,93 
Interest rate on total deposits         16858  -0,02  0,03  -0,07  0,44 
Interest rate on firm deposits         16517  -0,03  0,02  -0,07  0,44 
Interest rate on household deposits         15150  0,00  0,07  -0,07  0,48 
Interest rate on bank deposits         7134  0,01  0,07  -0,07  0,46 
Interest rate on total loans         16402  0,01  0,05  -0,07  0,45 
Interest rate on firm loans        16263  0,01  0,05  -0,07  0,43 
Interest rate on household loans        15038  0,02  0,06  -0,07  0,43 
Interest rate on bank loans        8238  0,02  0,09  -0,07  0,47 
Capital / Total assets  9069 0,30 0,22 -0,87 0,99  16954  0,27 0,19  -0,83  0,98 
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities  9069 0,47 0,79 0,00 9,99  16954  0,71 0,79  0,00  9,99 
Bad loans / Total loans  9069 0,06 0,16 0,00 1,00  16954  0,04 0,11  0,00  1,00 
Return on assets  9069 -0,02 0,04 -0,41 0,93  16954  -0,04 0,03  -0,50  0,87 
Excess reserves / Total assets  9069 0,06 0,09 0,00 0,88  16954  0,12 0,13  0,00  0,96 
Loans to non-banks / Total assets  9069 0,40 0,21 0,00 0,99  16954  0,41 0,20  0,00  0,99 
Loans to households / Loans to non-
banks  9069 0,11 0,19 0,00 1,00  16954  0,12 0,19  0,00  1,00 
Term deposits / Total deposits  9069 0,31 0,27 0,00 1,00  16954  0,31 0,24  0,00  1,00 
Personnel expenses / Total assets                 16954  0,01  0,01  0,00  0,26 
Note: The table presents the summary statistics of the bank-specific variables with each observation representing a measure for a single bank in a specific quarter. Only observations used in at least 
one of the regressions are included.  
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Table III. Response of Growth of Total Deposits to Bank Risk Characteristics 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis  Overlapping post-crisis supperiods (rolling window of one year)  Explanatory Variables 
Apr97-
Jul98 
Oct99-
Jan03 
Oct99-
Jul00 
Apr00-
Jan01 
Oct00-
Jul01 
Apr01-
Jan02 
Oct01-
Jul02 
Apr02-
Jan03 
          
Capital / Total assets  0,212  0,693 1,200 1,372 1,398 1,502 1,660 2,035 
t-statistic 4,57  10,06 6,12 6,26 6,54 5,82 5,05 7,78 
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities  0,039  0,120 0,220 0,210 0,210 0,122 0,196 0,089 
t-statistic 2,27  5,17 4,54 3,47 2,42 2,03 3,17 1,95 
Change in loan quality  -0,648  -0,751 -1,040 -0,356 -0,591 -0,611 -0,285 -0,638 
t-statistic -5,95  -2,98 -2,27 -0,71 -1,12 -1,74 -1,29 -1,72 
Return on assets  0,742  0,301  -0,107 -0,770 -2,678 -0,589 -0,691 0,823 
t-statistic 2,78  0,55  -0,08 -0,69 -2,46 -0,60 -0,85 1,22 
Excess reserves / Total assets  -0,094  -0,813 -1,369 -1,296 -1,356 -1,162 -0,841 -0,973 
t-statistic -0,79  -9,72 -7,02 -6,25 -6,81 -5,70 -4,06 -4,30 
Loans to non-banks / Total assets  -0,038  0,286 0,870 0,567 0,185 0,265 0,364 0,408 
t-statistic -0,88  3,84 4,71 3,42 0,87 0,81 1,31 2,03 
Loans to households / Loans to 
non-banks  -0,005  0,011 0,058 0,142 0,131 0,059  -0,105  -0,112 
t-statistic -0,09  0,19 0,31 0,80 0,83 0,30  -0,48  -0,61 
Term deposits / Total deposits  -0,024  -0,007  -0,007 0,368 0,341 0,085 0,194 0,291 
t-statistic -0,77  -0,13  -0,05 2,04 2,05 0,48 1,11 2,25 
Personnel expenses / Total assets    6,190  6,953  8,017  11,164 14,542 21,005 15,595 
t-statistic   4,21 2,40 1,93 2,84 5,52 6,94 5,03 
          
Number  of  observations  9069  16954 4943 4883 4888 4902 4744 4674 
Number  of  banks  1657 1386 1313 1267 1266 1265 1256 1259 
R-squared  0,06 0,10 0,18 0,16 0,18 0,17 0,20 0,21 
F-test  fixed  effects  (p-value)  0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Note: The table reports regression results of the growth of total deposits on bank risk characteristics. Within (fixed effects) or pooled results are 
reported. When the fixed effects are not jointly significant at 10 percent, pooled OLS results are reported. Estimates for time dummies, fixed effects, and 
the constant term are not reported, even though they are included in the regressions. Robust t-statistics are in italics. The ratio of personnel expenses to 
total assets is not included in the pre-crisis specification because of the data limitations.  
  31
 
Table IV. Response of Interest Rates Paid on Total Deposits to Bank Risk Characteristics 
Post-crisis  Overlapping post-crisis supperiods (rolling window of one year) 
Explanatory Variables  Oct99-
Jan03 
Oct99-
Jul00 
Apr00-
Jan01 
Oct00-
Jul01 
Apr01-
Jan02 
Oct01-
Jul02 
Apr02-
Jan03 
         
Capital / Total assets  -0,004 -0,016  0,004 -0,016 -0,007 -0,010 -0,004 
t-statistic  -1,13 -1,49  0,48 -2,12 -1,16 -1,30 -0,72 
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities  -0,001 -0,001 -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 
t-statistic  -1,81 -1,14 -1,41 -1,13 -0,57 -1,05 -0,56 
Change in loan quality  -0,003 0,004 -0,011 0,006 0,004 -0,012  0,000 
t-statistic  -0,64 0,59 -0,85 1,18 1,23 -0,88  0,00 
Return on assets  -0,007 -0,004 0,026  0,018 -0,002 -0,001  -0,031 
t-statistic  -0,48 -0,13 1,02  1,18 -0,18 -0,04  -0,54 
Excess reserves / Total assets  -0,005 0,001  0,009 -0,010 0,004 -0,006  -0,001 
t-statistic  -1,69 0,10  1,64 -2,02 0,88 -1,51  -0,30 
Loans to non-banks / Total assets  0,000 -0,001 0,001 -0,011  -0,001 0,003  -0,002 
t-statistic  0,13 -0,06 0,08 -1,14  -0,09 0,52  -0,50 
Loans to households / Loans to non-banks  0,010  0,008 -0,009 0,017 -0,002 0,005 0,003 
t-statistic  2,08  1,17 -0,61 2,03 -0,48 1,40 1,12 
Term deposits / Total deposits  0,024 0,023 0,008 0,015 0,010 0,010 0,005 
t-statistic  8,12 2,94 1,48 2,77 2,04 3,46 1,81 
Personnel expenses / Total assets  -0,458 -0,198 -0,044 -0,370 -0,069 -0,275 -0,211 
t-statistic  -6,25 -1,86 -0,62 -3,31 -1,14 -2,98 -1,71 
         
Number  of  observations  16858 4904 4859 4863 4874 4724 4658 
Number  of  banks  1376 1302 1265 1264 1262 1253 1259 
R-squared  0,30 0,14 0,12 0,34 0,69 0,56 0,74 
F-test fixed effects (p-value)  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
Note: The table reports regression results of the interest rates paid on deposits on bank risk characteristics. Within (fixed effects) or pooled results are 
reported. When the fixed effects are not jointly significant at 10 percent, pooled OLS results are reported. Estimates for time dummies, fixed effects, and 
the constant term are not reported, even though they are included in the regressions. Robust t-statistics are in italics. Only results for the post-crisis 
period are reported due to the data limitations.  
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Table V. Split by Legal Status of Depositors 
Firms Households Banks 
Deposit Growth 
Deposit 
rate Deposit  Growth 
Deposit 
rate Deposit  Growth 
Deposit 
rate  Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
           
Capital / Total assets  0,211  0,584 -0,009 0,069  0,277 -0,006 0,218 0,227 -0,018 
t-statistic 4,04  7,95 -2,51 1,23  2,97 -0,62 1,77 2,26 -1,63 
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities  0,069  0,132 0,000 0,035  0,060 -0,002 -0,080 -0,002 -0,003 
t-statistic 3,34  5,74 0,52 1,23  2,75 -1,79 -1,39 -0,09 -1,96 
Change in loan quality  -0,550  -0,784 0,001 -0,537  -0,285 -0,003 -0,388 -0,631 -0,004 
t-statistic -4,56  -3,65 0,68 -2,78  -2,20 -0,30 -0,94 -1,90 -0,18 
Return on assets  0,810  0,050 0,010 1,390  0,561 0,012 0,332 1,405 0,043 
t-statistic 2,18  0,09 1,95 3,94  1,66 0,45 0,25 1,83 0,80 
Excess reserves / Total assets  -0,197  -1,028 0,003 -0,243  0,033 0,011 0,332 0,454 -0,012 
t-statistic -1,57  -10,93 1,77  -1,01  0,28 1,25 0,44 2,60 -0,76 
Loans to non-banks / Total assets  -0,029  0,293 0,005 -0,078  0,242 0,010 -0,265 -0,013 0,004 
t-statistic -0,56  3,78 2,64 -1,34  2,83 1,23 -2,63 -0,17 0,39 
Loans to households / Loans to 
non-banks  -0,049  0,002 0,001 -0,100  -0,224 0,042 0,143 -0,168 -0,010 
t-statistic -0,76  0,03 0,40 -1,53  -2,64 4,83 0,89 -2,48 -0,80 
Term deposits / Total deposits  0,201  0,515 0,009 -0,462  -1,024 0,012 -0,135 -0,120 0,006 
t-statistic 4,90  8,50 5,00 -9,78  -13,91 1,85  -1,85 -2,29 0,91 
Personnel expenses / Total assets    7,527 -0,060    0,143 -1,281   1,304  -0,438 
t-statistic   4,65 -2,41    0,12 -6,49   0,79  -1,89 
           
Number  of  observations  9059 16952  16575 8471 15716  15172 3607  5890  7148 
Number  of  banks  1656 1386 1378 1598 1304 1301  834  872  1040 
R-squared  0,05 0,12 0,57 0,06 0,04 0,24 0,03 0,01 0,10 
F-test  fixed  effects  (p-value)  0,35 0,00 0,00 0,98 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 
Note: The table reports regression results of deposit growth and interest rates on bank risk characteristics for firms, households and banks. Within (fixed effects) or pooled results are 
reported. When the fixed effects are not jointly significant at 10 percent, pooled OLS results are reported. Estimates for time dummies, fixed effects, and the constant term are not 
reported, even though they are included in the regressions. Robust t-statistics are in italics. The ratio of personnel expenses to total assets is not included in the pre-crisis specification 
because of the data limitations. Results for the interest rate regressions are reported for the post-crisis period only due to the data limitations.  
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Table VI. Robustness checks 
  Only Non-pocket banks 
Explanatory Variables 
All Banks  Non-state Banks 
Legal definition  Definition 1  Definition 2 
  D I D I D I D I  D  I 
              
Capital / Total assets  0,693 -0,004 0,690 -0,004 0,699 -0,006 0,666 -0,006  0,667  -0,007 
t-statistic  10,06  -1,13 9,98 -1,05 9,82 -1,43 8,57 -1,41  7,08  -1,35 
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities  0,120 -0,001 0,122 -0,001 0,121 -0,001 0,134 -0,001  0,105  -0,001 
t-statistic  5,17 -1,81 5,21 -2,16 5,00 -1,91 4,96 -1,95  3,71  -1,34 
Change in loan quality  -0,751 -0,003 -0,753 -0,003 -0,739 -0,002 -0,651 -0,003  -0,277  -0,004 
t-statistic  -2,98 -0,64 -2,97 -0,67 -2,70 -0,37 -2,12 -0,62  -0,88  -0,62 
Return on assets  0,301 -0,007 0,333 -0,007 0,344 -0,004 0,309 -0,008  0,194  -0,004 
t-statistic  0,55 -0,48 0,61 -0,46 0,60 -0,23 0,50 -0,49  0,27  -0,26 
Excess reserves / Total assets  -0,813 -0,005 -0,821 -0,006 -0,815 -0,006 -0,842 -0,007  -0,757  -0,007 
t-statistic  -9,72 -1,69 -9,69 -1,77 -9,40 -1,80 -8,51 -1,87  -6,21  -1,48 
Loans to non-banks / Total assets  0,286 0,000 0,286 0,000 0,286 0,001 0,287 0,001  0,265  -0,002 
t-statistic  3,84 0,13 3,80 0,04 3,69 0,32 3,19 0,19  2,25  -0,42 
Loans to households / Loans to non-
banks  0,011 0,010 0,010 0,010 0,013 0,011 0,032 0,007  0,013  0,012 
t-statistic  0,19 2,08 0,17 2,12 0,23 2,09 0,53 1,34  0,19  2,44 
Term deposits / Total deposits  -0,007 0,024 -0,012 0,024 -0,007 0,024 -0,030 0,024  -0,059  0,023 
t-statistic  -0,13 8,12 -0,23 8,08 -0,14 7,91 -0,48 7,07  -0,76  4,80 
Personnel expenses / Total assets  6,190 -0,458 6,153 -0,457 6,167 -0,460 5,709 -0,419  5,480  -0,345 
t-statistic  4,21 -6,25 4,15 -6,17 4,09 -6,09 3,35 -5,09  2,40  -3,68 
              
Number of observations  16954  16858 16647 16552 16095 16003 12135 12054 7364  7300 
Number of banks  1386  1376 1359 1349 1312 1303 1012 1004 647  639 
R-squared 0,10  0,30 0,11 0,30 0,10 0,30 0,11 0,28  0,09  0,26 
F-test  fixed  effects  (p-value)  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00  0,00  0,00 
Note: The table reports regression results of deposit growth (D) and interest rates (I) on bank risk characteristics. Within (fixed effects) or pooled 
results are reported. When the fixed effects are not jointly significant at 10 percent, pooled OLS results are reported. Estimates for time dummies, 
fixed effects, and the constant term are not reported, even though they are included in the regressions. Robust t-statistics are in italics.  
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Table VII. Supply of Total Deposits 
  Only Non-pocket banks 
Explanatory Variables 
All Banks  Non-state Banks 
Legal definition  Definition 1  Definition 2 
                 
Capital  /  Total  assets  2,107 2,311 2,111 2,294 2,087 2,261 2,076 2,259  1,974  2,095 
t-statistic  13,09 10,51 13,08 10,61 13,09 10,45 11,48  9,06 9,65  7,84 
Liquid  assets  /  Demand  liabilities  0,226 0,232 0,225 0,233 0,231 0,239 0,254 0,262  0,219  0,225 
t-statistic  6,20 6,34 6,07 6,24 5,93 6,09 5,85 5,98  4,11  4,22 
Change in loan quality  -0,771  -0,750  -0,763  -0,743 -0,753 -0,732 -0,609 -0,604  -0,281  -0,272 
t-statistic  -2,81 -2,61 -2,78 -2,58 -2,60 -2,39 -1,95 -1,81  -0,81  -0,71 
Excess reserves / Total assets  -1,540  -1,514  -1,538  -1,517 -1,550 -1,528 -1,600 -1,580  -1,458  -1,428 
t-statistic  -12,79 -13,49 -13,10 -13,54 -13,09 -13,43 -11,96 -12,24  -9,04  -9,09 
Loans  to  non-banks  /  Total  assets  0,611 0,620 0,608 0,615 0,634 0,637 0,586 0,602  0,676  0,680 
t-statistic  3,91 4,34 3,97 4,31 4,15 4,42 3,11 3,41  2,78  2,88 
Term deposits / Total deposits  0,310 0,291 0,309 0,289 0,307 0,285 0,255 0,233  0,243 0,230 
t-statistic  2,70 2,67 2,72 2,66 2,67 2,56 1,85 1,74  1,42  1,36 
Personnel expenses / Total assets  14,458  14,087  14,268 13,916 14,311 13,972 13,759 13,571  13,311  12,961 
t-statistic  5,04 5,07 5,01 5,00 4,98 4,94 4,21 4,20  2,87  2,84 
Interest  rate  14,564 22,941 13,507 21,647 13,153 21,171 14,609 21,916 12,438  16,151 
t-statistic  1,95 2,97 2,04 2,85 2,11 2,84 2,09 2,65  2,08  2,14 
Interest rate ^2  -124,359  -98,466  -115,800 -94,103 -110,010 -91,084 -115,563 -96,871 -79,520 -65,295 
t-statistic  -2,05 -2,33 -2,22 -2,47 -2,27 -2,49 -2,41 -2,53  -2,41  -2,34 
Interest rate * (1-Capital)    -35,305    -33,961  -33,645  -31,668   -23,233 
t-statistic   -2,20  -2,21  -2,19  -1,86    -1,46 
Interest rate * (1-Capital)^2    23,744   23,225  23,655  21,948    17,422 
t-statistic   2,21  2,21  2,26  1,93    1,71 
              
Number  of  observations  16518 16518 16221 16221 15679 15679 11775 11775  7066  7066 
Number  of  banks  1359 1359 1332 1332 1286 1286  987  987 622  622 
AR(2)  p-value  0,48 0,24 0,36 0,20 0,37 0,23 0,51 0,37  0,16  0,13 
Hansen  test  p-value  0,16 0,10 0,16 0,10 0,11 0,09 0,57 0,37  0,51  0,30 
Implied  switching  point  0,06 0,12 0,06 0,12 0,06 0,12 0,06 0,11  0,08  0,12 
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Note: The table reports regression results of the growth of total deposits on bank risk characteristics, the deposit rate, and a number of interaction 
terms. The Difference GMM estimator is used. Terms involving deposit rate are treated as endogenous. Lending rate, its square and suitably lagged 
values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. Estimates for time dummies are not reported, even though they are included in the 
regressions. Robust t-statistics are in italics. The 2
nd order autocorrelation test tests the null hypothesis of no 2
nd order autocorrelation in the 
differenced residuals. The Hansen test tests the validity of over-identifying restrictions and is robust to heteroscedasticity.  Only results for the post-
crisis period are reported due to the data limitations.  
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Table VIII. Supply of Total Deposits: Split by Total Assets 
 Post-crisis 
Explanatory Variables  Small banks  Big banks 
    
Capital / Total assets  2,118 1,967 
t-statistic  12,71 7,13 
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities  0,244 0,013 
t-statistic  6,42 0,24 
Change in loan quality  -0,946 0,864 
t-statistic  -3,66 1,21 
Excess reserves / Total assets  -1,541 -1,059 
t-statistic  -12,90 -4,13 
Loans to non-banks / Total assets  0,677 0,293 
t-statistic  4,45 1,10 
Term deposits / Total deposits  0,278 0,460 
t-statistic  2,25 2,52 
Personnel expenses / Total assets  13,562 21,541 
t-statistic  4,81 4,56 
Interest rate  10,998 12,751 
t-statistic  2,05 1,74 
Interest rate ^2  -103,078 -56,008 
t-statistic  -2,39 -3,09 
    
Number of observations  13215 3304 
Number of banks  1194 382 
AR(2) p-value  0,38 0,17 
Hansen test p-value  0,16 0,81 
Implied switching point  0,05 0,11 
 
Note: The table reports regression results of the growth of total deposits on bank risk 
characteristics, the deposit rate and deposit rate squared. The Difference GMM estimator is 
used. Terms involving deposit rate are treated as endogenous. Lending rate, its square and 
suitably lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. Estimates for time 
dummies are not reported, even though they are included in the regressions. Robust t-statistics 
are in italics. The 2
nd order autocorrelation test tests the null hypothesis of no 2
nd order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. The Hansen test tests the validity of over-
identifying restrictions and is robust to heteroscedasticity.  Only results for the post-crisis 
period are reported due to the data limitations.  
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Figure 1. Implied Deposit Growth in the Deposit Rate – Capital Space. 
 
Based on the estimated supply function (see Table VII) for different interest rates and capitalisation 
the figure shows implied deposit growth. Other regressors are assumed constant and are taken at their 
average values. Panel A represents a specification for all banks, while panel B for non-insider banks 
based on definition 2. 
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Figure 2. Implied Deposit Growth: Split by Bank Size. 
 
Based on the estimated supply function (see Table VIII) for different interest rates the figure shows 
implied deposit growth. Other regressors are assumed constant and are taken at their average values.  
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1 In many emerging market economies, depositors’ willingness and ability to monitor banks is influenced by the 
presence of large state-owned and/or foreign-owned banks. The deposits of the former often carry an implicit, if 
not explicit, insurance guarantee. And foreign banks may be recognized as already being exposed to discipline by 
the international markets on which their debt and equity trade (Caprio and Honohan, 2004). Relative to its level of 
development, however, Russia (during our period of analysis) had neither a relatively large state nor foreign-owned 
banking sector (Barth et al., 2006). In 2001, for example, over half of the banking system’s assets were held at 
privately owned, domestic banks.  
2 The following considerations are factored positively into a country’s score on the PSM index: (1) whether a 
certified external audit of the bank’s financial statement is required; (2) whether all of the ten biggest banks are 
rated by international rating agencies; (3) whether income statements include accrued or unpaid interest or 
principal on non-performing loans and whether banks are required to produce consolidated financial statements; 
(4) whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public; (5) whether banks must disclose risk management 
procedures to the public; and (6) whether subordinated debt is allowable as a part of regulatory capital. The 
version of the PSM index presented in Barth et al. (2006) is slightly modified to include the percentage of the ten 
biggest banks rated by domestic rating agencies; since there is no entry for Russia in this sub-category, its PSM 
index is not reported. The authors’ measures of bank transparency paint a similar picture. With respect to both the 
quality of its bank audit regime and its pace in adopting best practice accounting standards, Russia is ranked in the 
bottom third of countries surveyed.    
3 Bank risk characteristics are entered into their regressions individually.  
4 Barth et al.’s (2004) PSM index for Russia (5) lags behind those Argentina and Chile (both 8) as well as Mexico 
(6). 
5 In Hellman et al.’s model (1998, 2000), deposit rate competition among banks lowers their franchise value and, 
with it, incentives for making non-risky loans.  The quote in the text above is taken from the working paper 
version (1998), which considers this competition in a world without deposit insurance. In an unpublished paper,  
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Hanousek and Roland (2001) model a similar relationship and offer some empirical support from the Czech 
Republic.      
6 Stiglitz (1994), one of the article’s co-authors, suggests in a book on post-communist reform that it would be 
unrealistic to rely on the private market to discipline banks: “Individuals have neither the capacity nor the 
incentive, even in the absence of deposit insurance, to monitor effectively (247).”  
7 The panel is unbalanced because some banks fail, some merge, and some are founded during the sample period. 
8 The full set of right and left-hand side variables are described in greater detail in Section 2. 
9 Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) note that using net deposit flows alone may not allow distinctions to be 
drawn between market and regulatory discipline. That is, regulatory pressure on under-capitalized banks could 
result in a bank deciding to reduce both its assets and liabilities, accomplishing the latter through reduced deposit 
rates.   
10 Data restrictions prevent us from estimating model (2) for the period prior to the 1998 financial crisis. 
11 Small sample size prevents us from doing a meaningful analysis for the group of state-owned banks alone. 
12  To achieve the needed adjustment in the total cost of funds, however, the adjustment of only some deposit 
rates is necessary. This makes the total lending rate a weaker instrument for deposit rates that apply to actors of a 
particular type (i.e., households, firms or banks). Therefore, we estimate the supply function for total deposits only. 
13 We employ the heteroscedasticity robust version of the Sargan test, the Hansen J statistic. We also test for the 
absence of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. 
14 See Vestnik Banka Rossii No. 75 of November 20, 1997 and No. 33-34 of June 27, 2000 (www.cbr.ru).  
15 For example, the monthly financial periodical Den’gi i Kredit regularly publishes the financial statements of a 
number of banks. 
16 Since January 1998, the major monthly financial indicators for all Russian banks have been made available at 
www.banks-rate.ru.  
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17 For more information on these firms, see their respective websites at www.interfax.ru and www.mobile.ru. 
18 Karas and Schoors (2005) provide a detailed comparison of the datasets and demonstrate their consistency with 
one another. 
19 Given the relatively small number of mergers and acquisitions (30) in comparison to the number of banks in our 
sample (about 1500), we do not expect that a different treatment of mergers would have a significant impact on 
our results. 
20 Taking into account the imperfect nature of such a measure, we had to drop unreasonable values and outliers to 
prevent them from driving our regression results. Given the high interest rates known to have prevailed after the 
1998 crisis (i.e., even the weighted average interest rate paid on household deposits up to 1 year in the first quarter 
of 1999 was above 20% (www.cbr.ru)), we decided to treat all rates below 50% as reasonable. Other cut-off points 
were examined as well, but the regression results always remained qualitatively unchanged. 
21 We should note that most of our risk measures (e.g., capitalization, liquidity, return on assets, asset structure etc.) 
can also be constructed from the data publicly available free of charge (see the aforementioned website   
www.banks-rate.ru). 
22 The list of state-owned banks was compiled from Sherif et al. (2003), Matovnikov (2002) and Mamontov (2005). 
23 Their exclusion however does not alter the results. 
24 For the official definition of these and other regulatory standards see Bank of Russia Instruction No.1 of 
October 1, 1997, “On Bank Regulation Procedure” (an English version is available on www.cbr.ru). 
25 As suggested by the data in Panel B of Table II, the difference between the pre- and post-crisis results is not a 
function of a change in the variance of the explanatory variables. 
26 Because of data limitations, we only provide estimates for 1999 onward.  
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